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What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on
kinship andpersonal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation
and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals?
We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules
that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating
institutions, humans have been able to move from the default ‘Hobbesian’
rules of the ‘game of life’, determined by physical/environmental constraints,
into self-created rules of social organizationwhere cooperation can be individu-
ally advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples
include rules of food sharing in hunter–gatherers, rules for the usage of
irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing
reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of
interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals
that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming
institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abil-
ities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding
likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed
anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-
reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale
human social organization.1. Introduction
Life on the Earth has undergone a series of major evolutionary transitions in
which individuals at a lower level of biological organization came together to
form higher level units [1]. Examples include replicating molecules coming
together to form protocells, single-celled individuals evolving into multicellular
organisms and solitary insects transitioning into eusocial colonies. The final
transition proposed by Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry [1] is the origin of
human societies. Yet, while the other major evolutionary transitions are starting
to become well understood [2,3], there is a lack of a cohesive theory that can
explain the transition from primate social organization based on kinship and
personal exchange to human societies with large-scale impersonal exchange
and division of labour between unrelated individuals.
Human societies do indeed largely meet the criteria for a major evolutionary
transition [3]. For example, just as epigenetic inheritance (a novel inheritance
mechanism) allows the cells in a multicellular organism to differentiate and
profit from a division of labour, so language (a novel cultural inheritance mechan-
ism) allows human individuals to coordinate and specialize in different tasks, and
so also to profit from a division of labour. Similarly, while by most measures, a
multicellular organism is more complex than a single cell, so human chiefdoms
aremore complex than hunter–gatherer bands in terms of the number of hierarch-
ical levels of organization [4]. And just as multicellular organisms with division of
labour and sterile somatic cells gradually evolved from single-celled ancestors,
so cultural phylogenies (based on language trees) point to states evolving gradu-
ally from chiefdoms, which in turn evolved gradually from hunter–gatherer
macro-bands and tribes [4].
small-scale societies
medium-scale societies
large-scale, 
non-coercion-based
societies
large-scale,
coercion-based
societies
language
agriculture
ca 500 kya
ca 12 kya
Figure 1. Sub-transitions of the major transition from small- to large-scale human societies, with the major triggers for subsequent changes indicated, as well as
crude estimates of the timing of these transitions. Solving the collective action problems inherent in large-scale agriculture may or may not have involved coercion
depending on the society (e.g. over management of irrigation [5–7]). However, the surpluses provided by agriculture eventually led to hierarchal institutions that
were prone to collapse and be reformed [8], culminating in the first states ca 4 kya.
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2We propose to subdivide the major transition to large-
scale human societies into four distinct, smaller transitions
(figure 1). (i) The origin of the human hunter–gatherer niche,
characterized by large but hard to acquire food packages,
allomaternal care and egalitarian social structure. (ii) The
origin of language, a novel unlimited inheritance system that
strongly facilitates cumulative cultural evolution and nego-
tiation between individuals. (iii) The Neolithic revolution,
which involved the shift to agricultural and sedentary popu-
lations with hierarchical social organization. (iv) The origin of
states, where interactions regularly occur between non-kin
who may never meet again.
We will assume that the first transition, from a largely
vegetarian primate living in fission–fusion societies in wood-
land landscapes, to a savannah-living partly carnivorous
cooperative hunter type of living,wasmadepossible by changes
in social organization not unlike those seen in other lineages that
ended up adopting a combination of cooperative breeding and
hunting (e.g. [9]). Our focus here, then, is on explaining the
transitions in social organization subsequent to the emergence
of language. Current estimates place the origin of modern-like
language at either less than 100 kya or at around 500 kya, with
the older date being the most plausible [10].
Fromaneconomicpoint of view, themajor transition is from
an initial state of autarky in which group members do not typi-
cally exchange resources with each other, to one of catallaxy
where there is extreme division of labour and hence extreme
interdependence between group members. In non-human pri-
mate social systems, each individual itself produces most of
the resources and technology it needs to survive and reproduce.
By contrast, while hunter–gatherer individuals can typically
still each produce their own technology, they are reliant on the
sharing of food with other individuals in order to survive.
Finally, in large-scale human societies, individuals rely on
trade with non-kin for nearly all of their vital resources, and
an individualwill not always itself possess the entire knowledge
necessary to produce any single piece of technology.
Here, we develop the hypothesis that the human capacity to
form institutionswas a key driver of the transition to large-scale
societies (and may indeed be necessary for their formation).
Institutions (sensu [11]) are human-devisedmechanisms for gen-
erating the rules of social interactions. Through communication
and negotiation, humans can transform the rules of their ‘game
of life’. The game of life depends on two kinds of constraints.
The first kind consists of exogenous biotic and abiotic factors
that cannot be changed by individuals at the time they are inter-
acting [11,12]. These factors include the laws of physics and thecurrent environment which comprises, for example, the current
total resource endowment and the individuals’ state of technol-
ogy. The second type of constraints is behavioural in nature and
so can potentially be modified by the individuals themselves
[11,12]. This includes restraining or expanding behavioural
options. By creating institutions, individuals can change the
rules aspect of their social interactions, thereby increasing
some possibilities without foreclosing others, and potentially
tipping the balance froma situationwhere defection is individu-
ally advantageous into one where it pays to cooperate [12–16].
As we shall discuss below, theoretical work in economics has
formally demonstrated conditions under which this can occur
even in arbitrarily large groups of unrelated individuals where
participants meet very infrequently [14–16].
Humans can create these institutions because they possess
various cognitive features that are lacking in other primates
and that are necessary to devise and enforce institutional
rules. These include shared intentionality, strong inhibitory con-
trol and a willingness to seek out mutual opportunities. We
explain below how these skills evolved as a result of the adop-
tion of cooperative breeding early in the Homo lineage. Once
in place, they could then be co-opted for institution formation.
In §2, we first define the term institution more precisely,
before delineating their costs and benefits, and discussing the
cognitive prerequisites necessary for their evolution. In §3 we
then discuss how the institutional-path hypothesis can explain
the key steps of social evolution from hunter–gatherers with
language to large-scale states.2. Institutions
(a) What is an institution?
In general, the outcome(s) of an individual’s behaviour, in terms
of its fitness consequences and/or material rewards, depends
upon thebehaviourof other individuals aswell as onexogenous
biotic and abiotic factors. In game theory [17,18], a game form
defines the behavioural options—the ‘strategies’—available to
each individual, and the relationship between strategies and
outcomes. The game form thus specifies the rules of social inter-
actions or, in other words, the ‘rules of the game’, which are
usually and casually referred to in evolutionary biology as a
game. More particularly, in game theory, a game consists of
a game form and the preferences of individuals over alterna-
tive outcomes, and thus allows the equilibrium strategies to be
determined [17,18]. In evolutionary biology, strategies are
often (but not always) assumed to be genetically or culturally
the institution/ 
the political game form
individual preferences
for the rules of the
economic game form
the economic game form
the institutional
rules
individual preferences 
over outcomes of 
the economic game form
material
pay-offs
Figure 2. An institution is a mechanism of communication whose output is the rules for economic interactions. As such, one is in the presence of a political game form,
where the preferences of group members for institutional rules are expressed, followed by an economic game form. The political game form could give equal weight to the
preferences of all group members, as in egalitarian institutions, or could give more weight to dominant individuals, as happened with the origin of agriculture. The result
of the political game form is the rules (or game form) for the subsequent economic interactions. The economic interactions determine the fitness or material rewards to
individuals and may, for example, be a variant of a public goods or coordination game, or an exchange economy where goods are traded.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150098
3inherited, in which case it is directly the evolutionary process
and not the preferences that determine equilibrium strategies.
When individuals can communicate with each other, and
when the strategies consist of messages, a game form is often
called a mechanism [11]. We follow Hurwicz [11] in consider-
ing that an institution is a mechanism whose outcome is a
game form. The hallmark of an institution is a sequence of
at least two sets of social interactions:
(i) Active genesis of institutional rules through communi-
cation and bargaining by the individuals in a group (or
subset thereof).
(ii) Economic interactions whose outcomes are material,
and which are affected by the institutional rules.
An institution thus consists of a political game form, which
determines the rules of the subsequent economic interactions
(figure 2). These two types of interaction are likely to take
place on very different time-scales. In particular, the political
game form is likely to be played much less frequently than
the economic game form. For example, the economic game
form will likely be played many times in a single generation,
while the institutional rulesmayonly change once every several
generations. The rules of the political game can also themselves
be set by rules generated by another game form [11], referred
to as a ‘constitutional’ game form by Ostrom [19, p. 59]. This
constitutional game form will, in turn, be played even less fre-
quently. Finally, the rules of the constitutional game form will
themselves be set by a ‘meta-constitutional’ game form, but
this series of rule-generating game forms eventually begins
with the unchangeable rules of the biophysical world and ter-
minates with the economic game form that generates material
pay-offs [19]. Because our focus is on the distinction between
generating rules versus playing the economic game form, for
simplicity we consider only one political game form and one
economic game form.
A more all-encompassing and formal definition of insti-
tutions than that given above exists (most notably the one by
Hurwicz [11, p. 128]), but for our purposes it is enough
to see an institution as a mechanism involving communica-
tion whose outcomes are rules of interactions. Non-linguistic
animals are probably unable to produce institutions involving
many individuals, even though they play economic games,
because they are unlikely to autonomously generate
institutional rules through communication.The assemblies in modern hunter–gatherers that discuss
resource allocation rules or what would be adequate norms
of behaviour provide a good example of an institution as
defined above. We stress that the institution comprises the
negotiation process as well as the resulting norms or rules
of behaviour [11, p. 128]. This is in contrast to the cultural
evolution literature, which equates institutions with equilib-
rium norms of behaviour in an economic game form [20],
rather than with a political game form that generates rules
for the economic game form.(b) The benefits of institutions
The formation of institutional rules can transform the ‘Hobbes-
ian’ rules (or default rules) of the game of life into different
rules that lead to more cooperative outcomes, but why is
this? Since interactions are localized, it is important to realize
that social life in hominins largely consists of a repetition of
interactions that involve coordination or cooperation problems.
For repeated interactions, the fundamental folk theorem of
game theory [17,18,21] tells us that cooperation can ultimately
be sustained in an equilibrium by conditional strategies that
respond to players’ past actions (reciprocity).
Specifically, in an indefinitely long sequence of interactions
where individuals value future pay-offs and cannot completely
hide their actions, any strategy that guarantees a pay-off at least
asgreat astheminimaxpay-off in theunderlying stagegamecan
be an equilibrium [17,18,21]. The minimax pay-off is the largest
pay-off that an individual can receive if its opponent tries to
minimize the individual’s pay-off—in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
it would be the pay-off received when the opponent defects.
Therefore, if any individual deviates from the equilibrium strat-
egy, then its pay-off canbe reduced to theminimaxpay-off by its
co-players. Consequently, it does not pay an individual to devi-
ate from a strategy that gives more than its minimax pay-off.
This logic applies even to groups of infinitely large size where
an individual does not interact twicewith the samepartner, pro-
vided that there is away to transmit sufficient informationabout
the past behaviour of partners [14,22], i.e. reputation. It also
applies to interactions whereN-players interact simultaneously
[23], such as repeated collective action problems.
There are potentially three kinds of issues that can limit the
application of the folk theorem to sustain equilibria with high
individual material payoffs. Each of these can be addressed
by institutions. The first potential problem stems from the
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Figure 3. In the absence of institutions, individuals that engage in repeated
social interactions are likely to receive only the pay-off corresponding to the
default or Hobbesian equilibrium of the game of life (see also [12]). However,
when group members can communicate and negotiate an agreed coordin-
ation mechanism (i.e. create an institution), they can coordinate in the
economic game form on an equilibrium that potentially increases their
mutual pay-off relative to the Hobbesian equilibrium (shaded area, see
also [21,24]). The resulting equilibrium strategies are self-enforcing, in the
sense that it is both individually advantageous to follow them when
others are doing so, and individually advantageous to sanction group mem-
bers that do not follow them. Although this figure shows a group of two
individuals for illustration, the size of the shaded area and thus the benefit
of having institutions actually increases with the number of interacting
individuals. This is because the problems of coordinating on an equilibrium
without institutions increase with group size [25].
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4fact that there are infinitely many equilibria with some level of
cooperation [21,24]. But many of these equilibria will give pay-
offs that are hardly any better than the minimax pay-off, while
others will result in much greater pay-offs. If individuals act
independently, then they have no means to guarantee that
theywill coordinate on an equilibrium that gives high individu-
al pay-offs, and are likely to settle on the ‘default equilibrium’
determined by the default Hobbesian rules of interactions
(figure 3). Institutions can resolve this problem, because they
provide a means for individuals to amalgamate dispersed
information about resources and wants, and hence coordinate
their actions to reach an equilibrium that gives higher pay-offs
than the default equilibrium (figure 3). By devising rules of
interactions individuals settle on an equilibrium, transforming
the social contract (in the sense of [21,24]) from one that gives
only the pay-off of the Hobbesian equilibrium, to one where
the benefits of cooperation are achieved.
The second issue is that individuals need to value future
pay-offs, and the game needs to be indefinitely repeated. Insti-
tutional rules can help to make these conditions hold. For
example, Casari [26] describes the development of institutional
rules to govern the use of common agricultural land in the Ital-
ian Alps, between AD 1200 and 1800. The rules which most
villages ended up adopting tied families and their future des-
cendants into the group, by requiring that the sale or
purchase of rights to use the communal land was subject to a
majority vote among the other villagers. This ensured that indi-
viduals would then care about their future pay-offs and that
there was no simple way to end the game.
The third issue is that individuals need to have sufficient
information about the past behaviour of other individuals, a
problem which becomes all the more pressing as group size
increases. Institutional rules can help to alleviate these problems
by facilitating the spread of information between group mem-
bers. For example, extant groups managing common-pool
resources from irrigation systems to shared grazing landsmake agreements to appoint individuals to act as monitors,
and regularly hold assemblies of all group members to share
information [13,26]. Institutional rules that resolve social dilem-
mas also typically create centralized repositories for storing
information about the reputation of group members, which
was common for merchants in mediaeval Europe [14,16]. The
right institutional rules, then, can create an environment in
which the Folk Theorem can sustain equilibria that give high
individual material pay-offs. [27].
Institutional rules are typically not imposed externally, but
are the result of a political game form. Experiments have
repeatedly found that individuals placed in social dilemmas
and allowed to communicate achieve better outcomes than if
they are not allowed to communicate [28]. Those using com-
munication both to agree on a joint investment strategy and
to choose their own sanctioning system achieve results close
to the group’s optimum ([28], see also [29]). Field studies
have illustrated how institutional rules, designed by resource
users themselves, allow for the self-organized management
of irrigation [5,30,31], fishing and harvesting systems [13].
For example, in the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, insti-
tutional rules specify how much water each user may take at
a given time, how responsibilities for maintenance of the
system are shared and what the sanctions are for individuals
who break the rules. These rules are not imposed externally
but are created by assemblies of the irrigators themselves,
and indeed have been for a thousand years [13].
Critically, and contrary to cultural group selection argu-
ments (e.g. [32–34]), institutional rules in these situations
create an economic game form in which monitoring and
sanctioning are not altruistic (sensu evolutionary biology
[35]). Rather, field studies have demonstrated that successful
institutional rules create conditions that provide direct benefits
(sensu evolutionary biology [35]) to individuals that actively
monitor and enforce them [13,14,16,27,36]. As such, in con-
trast to altruistic punishment [33,37], they do not require
high genetic or cultural relatedness between group members.
For example, Ostrom describes how extant small-scale
societies incentivise group members to monitor each other, by
allowing individuals thatdiscoveracheater tokeepaproportion
of the fine levied on that cheater [13]. And as an example in
larger scale societies, in mediaeval Europe the Law Merchant
system of institutional rules was developed, where individuals
could pay a cost to register non-cooperative acts by their partner
with a judge. They could also pay a cost to query the system to
see whether their trading partner had any disputes registered
against them before transacting [14,16]. Judges could impose a
fine on cheaters, but had no means to force individuals to pay
this fine. Nevertheless, if a fine was imposed then it was in the
trader’s own interests to pay it in order tomaintain a good repu-
tationwith theLawMerchant, and so be able to reap the benefits
of cooperation with other individuals in future. Consequently,
this system of sanctioning was self-enforcing, even though tra-
ders could not be compelled to pay a fine, and had to finance
the Law Merchant system themselves [14].(c) The costs of institutions
Creating self-enforcing institutional rules is a costly process.
First, there are costs to setting up a self-enforcing system of
monitoring and sanctioning, such as paying judges in the
Law Merchant system. Second, time and energy must be
spent on negotiating the rules. While this can be done in
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5face-to-face discussions after sunset in hunter–gatherer groups,
negotiation becomes much more costly as group size increases.
Indeed, it cannot be overstated how difficult it is to agree on
something in a group. Arrow’s impossibility theorem [38]
says that there is no satisfactory way of making social decisions
once individuals have sufficiently different preferences. As a
result, institutional arrangements that need a high level of con-
sensus between group members may be inherently unstable
whenever individuals’ endowments and allegiances shift over
time, or when there is a turnover of players. Finally, some indi-
viduals may exert disproportional influence in the political
game form, driving the creation of rules that favour themselves
at the expense of others. The cooperation and coordin-
ation achieved under the institutional rules needs to provide
sufficient benefits to offset all of these costs, and thus improve
on the pay-off from the Hobbesian equilibrium (figure 3).
Nevertheless, the fact that we see cooperation-promoting insti-
tutions in the real world implies that this condition can in
principle be met.
(d) The uniqueness of institutions in humans
We emphasize here the uniquely human genesis of institutional
rules: the explicit and coordinated construction of group-wide
rules that regulate social interactions and that are enforced by
other group members. This contrasts in a fundamental way to
the usual mechanisms for social interactions considered in evol-
utionary biology. Other organisms can indeed condition their
behaviour on the actions of other individuals (e.g. reciprocity),
and they can modify their environment over time (niche con-
struction, [39]). Other animals also perform social learning,
imitating traditions of other group members such as bird
songs or techniques to open nuts. But crucially, we are aware
of no other species that over one individual’s lifetime can con-
struct arbitrary rules to regulate social activity, and then
enforce these rules by coordinated sanctioning (see also [40]
for a similar argument about the uniqueness of human culture).
For example, consider the institutional rules ofmarriage, the
details of which are particular to any one society. At first sight,
the reproductive strategy of monogamy adopted by many ani-
mals may seem to be the same. But this is not so, because the
institutional rules of marriage regulate what counts as mar-
riage, what the necessary preconditions for it to occur are
(e.g. the payment of dowries), who may marry whom, how a
marriage may be terminated, etc. These rules are necessarily
recognized and followed by many individuals, and violations
are enforced by coordinated sanctioning. In other words, they
define what is normative, and they change the economic
game form by changing the mapping between individual strat-
egies and the corresponding outcomes, i.e. the pay-off matrix.
By contrast, monogamy in the animal world is simply an indi-
vidual unilateral reproductive strategy that is not regulated by
rules and enforced by societal sanctioning, and so which does
not change the economic game form.
(e) The cognitive requirements of institutions
It is difficult to see how individuals could play the political
game form without certain cognitive faculties that are unique
to humans. Institutions involve individuals bargaining over
rules to structure their social interactions. This means that
they first need to be able to foresee alternative social contracts,
and then communicate and negotiate over them in order to
improve over the default Hobbesian rules. This requires atleast three types of advanced cognitive features. (i) To devise
alternative rules of interactions, individuals need to be able
to create virtual worlds. This requires planning, imagination,
causal understanding, large working memory and the ability
to anticipate future rewards. (ii) To communicate and bargain
efficiently over their rules of interactions, individuals need
language and a motivation to seek out information and know-
ledge, have shared intentionality, and a fully developed theory
of mind. (iii) To reach consensus, individuals need a strong
willingness to seek out mutual opportunities, as well as
strong inhibitory control.
These abilities are only partially present in other primates.
Why is this? After all, other primates have large brains [41] and
relativelywell-developed cognitive faculties. The answer is that
many of the traits require at least some degree of prosocial
motivations. Prosocial motivations are lacking in extant great
apes, from which we can infer that they were also lacking in
the common ancestor of the great apes and Homo. In the next
section, we present a hypothesis for why prosocial motivations
evolved in our lineage, and hence why our lineage evolved a
social cognition that could later be co-opted for the formation
of institutions.3. From primate autarky to human catallaxy
(a) The hunter–gatherer niche before language
and institutions
Elements of the hunter–gatherer, or forager, niche were
gradually assembled over the past 2 Myr or so, but details
necessarily remain sketchy. Because language must have
affected this niche (see §3b), we will try to reconstruct what
it looked like before language arose, based on comparative
evidence and on the archaeological and fossil records.
It is known that by the time good documentation of Homo
erectus is found, at ca 1.8 Ma, the basic elements of hunting
and gathering were in place [42]. We can infer aspects
of the social system [43], including bonding among males
(collective defence against large carnivores and subsequent
collective acquisition of meat) and male–female friendships
(as found in primates in very large groups, e.g. [44]). Large
meat packages inevitably meant wider sharing, including
with females and immatures. The latter would have increas-
ing difficulty supporting themselves, given the increasing
reliance on technology or endurance running, and thus
probably required energy inputs from others. Finally, their
large brain size, well above the so-called grey ceiling for
hominoids [45], suggests energy inputs for reproducing
females. In other words, H. erectus showed many elements
of extensive allomaternal care [9], i.e. cooperative breeding.
Comparative studies show that cooperative breeding
changes the psychology of primates, and indeed other mam-
mals such as elephants and African wild dogs, when
compared to their non-cooperatively breeding sister taxa [46].
These studies imply that cooperative breeding selects for a
high social tolerance and prosocial motivations, leading to
a marked increase in socio-cognitive abilities [46,47]. What is
unique inHomo is that cooperative breeding and the consequent
prosocial psychology were added on top of an already existing
large-brained ape-like cognitive system, inherited fromour earl-
ier hominin (australopithecine) ancestors. This created the
potential for a more advanced social cognition than that seen
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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6in other cooperatively breeding species. One especially per-
tinent feature of an ape cognitive system is an ability to
understand mental states in other individuals. In great apes,
this ability seems to only be used in competitive contexts [46].
But when prosocial motivations co-evolved with cooperative
breeding in the Homo lineage, this existing ability to grasp
mental states could start to be used in cooperative contexts. Ulti-
mately, this culminated in the evolution of shared intentionality
[46], i.e. the sharing of psychological states between individuals.
Shared intentionality, in turn, underlies many of the other cog-
nitive prerequisites for institution formation, including the use
of language to share information [48]. il.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150098(b) Hunter–gatherers after the advent of language
The origin of language is a complicated and well-studied
area, which we do not address directly here. However, we
note that once it evolved, language had two key consequences
for hunter–gatherer social evolution. First, language made
teaching more effective, which provided more scope for cumu-
lative cultural evolution and hence the development of new
technologies [49,50]. Second, once in place, language enabled
individuals to negotiate their rules of social interactions; that
is, to start to create institutions for the first time. These two
elements came together to produce greater cooperative division
of labour among post-language hunter–gatherers.
With the advent of new complex technologies, such as
poison-tipped arrows, nets and traps, it became possible
for individuals to hunt large game in much smaller groups
than before. Because hunting large game is inherently unpre-
dictable, having multiple hunting parties within a social unit
would provide benefits to wider food sharing as an insurance
scheme. Even the best hunters benefit from sharing because
this reduces the variance in their own and their offspring’s
daily calorific intake [51]. The improvements in safety and
hunting ability led to the break-up of the old group into smal-
ler subgroups, now called bands or camps. But crucially the
reputational effects of language allowed bonds to remain
strong among camps of the same community, as shown by
frequent moves between them. And increasing returns to
scale would provide an advantage to sharing with a larger
number of individuals, for example by allowing individuals
to overproduce food items that they found easy to obtain
and exchanging them for other items. Thus, fewer hunters
per party supported by a sharing system could massively
reduce variance in an individual’s yield [52]. Language
made it possible for the sharing networks to become larger
and therefore more stable.
Anthropological studies have shown that individuals in
extant hunter–gatherer groups consistently devise and use
institutional rules to regulate this kind of food sharing.
Indeed, extant hunter–gatherers spend much of their time
discussing rules of sharing and gossiping about violations
of these [51]. In other words, they negotiate institutional
rules and enforce these themselves. Examples includes rules
that specify who receives what part of a kill and what quan-
tity [40,53], with defectors being punished by a variety of
means from public ridicule through to ostracism and
execution [54]. While some other primates do practise some
degree of food sharing, they do not have non-dyadic systems
of food sharing which are regulated and enforced by impar-
tial rules that apply to everyone in the group [52]. This
suggests that institutional rules are necessary to regulatesuch systems of sharing [51], and hence that the supporting
institutional rules co-evolved with extended food sharing in
hunter–gatherers after the advent of language.
Hill [40] gives manymore examples of institutional rules in
extant hunter–gatherer societies. These include rules concern-
ing access to mating partners within the groups (prohibitions
and prescriptions on the basis of age, kin or ritual member-
ship), polygyny (degree allowed and who may practice it),
regulation of violent conflict within and between groups, and
rules regulating political power (rules of turn-taking in discus-
sions, and rules governing who will be the leader for different
social activities). Institutional rules also affect life history, by
specifying who must give resources to juveniles.
During the Upper Palaeolithic, we also see the emergence
of long-distance trade anddivision of labour beyond food shar-
ing. Evidence for this includes the remains ofmaterials that had
been transported hundreds of kilometres from their origins,
and the development of new tools that were specialized in per-
forming specific tasks [55]. Trade would have been strongly
favoured by the presence of institutions, because already
back then it required a mechanism by which individuals
could make faithful promises to invest in labour that would
only become useful when the finished product was exchanged.
While doing this, the individual would produce less food,
which would necessitate the pre-existence of rules for food
sharing. Finally, the efficiency of long-distance trade would
have been greatly enhanced by an institution for using some
type of (pre-numismatic) money. The existence of art and
other forms of symbolism suggest that Upper Palaeolithic
humans had the cognitive abilities to do this [55].
An important question concerns how institutional rules
were formed in Palaeolithic hunter–gatherers. In other
words, what did the political game form look like? Modern
hunter–gatherer groups spend much time discussing insti-
tutional rules and violations of these around the camp fire
after sunset [54]. Furthermore, observations of these groups
show egalitarian political interactions. Individuals typically
take turns to give their opinions during group discussions
[54]. The role of leaders seems to be to help the group to
reach a consensus, rather than to force their own opinion
upon others, or to benefit materially. Moreover, ethnographic
evidence suggests [54], and archaeological evidence confirms
[56], that status was not hereditary in these ancient mobile
hunter–gatherers. This egalitarianism likely evolved and was
maintained by a combination of high degrees of social inter-
dependence in obtaining and defending resources, and the
creation of lethal weapons that reduced the effects of physical
differences in strength between would-be dominants and sub-
ordinates [57]. Moreover, it would be difficult for any one
individual to monopolize meat from large game. Thus,
although each individual should be expected to try to craft
institutional rules that benefit itself, the egalitarian social struc-
turewould have prevented any one individual from being able
to benefit itself toomuch at the expense of the rest of the group.
Consequently, the political game form was likely to take the
shape of a mechanism that aggregated the preferences of all
group members [58] without resulting in too much dissent.
(c) The origin of agriculture, large social groups and
hierarchy
The origin of agriculture was likely made possible by many
factors [59], including the stabilization of the Earth’s climate
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7during the Holocene. However, successful agriculture would
have necessitated the expansion of the domain of regulation
by group institutions. It would require new property rights, to
ensure that an individual could not simply have his plants, ani-
mals, land or stored food taken by others [60]. Agriculture
would also require institutional rules to prevent the overexploit-
ation of land and other common-pool resources [13,26]. Groups
would also face new social dilemmas brought about by new,
shared technology, such as the construction and usage of irriga-
tion systems [6]. The existence of institutions therefore placed
humans in a unique position to benefit from agriculture.
It is plausible that institutions aimed at solving these prob-
lems co-evolved with the demographic expansion of human
groups brought about by agriculture. If cooperation problems
were solved, then larger group sizes could potentially benefit
individuals through both economies of scale (increasing returns
in material pay-off as a function of population size; [61]) and
economies of scope (increasing returns in material pay-off due
to variety, not size; [62]). The logic of this has been demon-
strated in a formal model of the coevolution of demography
with institutions to regulate irrigation [63]. The results were
that groupswith institutional rules that successfully solved col-
lective action problems grew to a larger size, and spread their
institutional rules to other groups through excess migration.
However, as humans shifted to intensive modes of sub-
sistence, the political game form itself started to change [64].
With the advent of storage technologies, it became possible
for some individuals to start to build up a surplus of resources
and form patrilineal clans for their defence. Permanent agricul-
ture, especially irrigation systems, would have tied individuals
to their group, making it hard to escape a despotic leader.
The result was that agriculture triggered a shift from egalitar-
ianism back to despotic social structure. Despotic leaders that
commanded surpluses of resources would then be able to
influence institutions for their own good at the expense of
other group members, in a way that they could not have done
previously in an egalitarian structure. For example, leaders
could dominate the political game form and skew the economic
rules in their favour by enforcing (with coalitional support)
what proportion of surplus resources from irrigation farming
they could keep for themselves rather than share with the rest
of the group [65,66]. Consequently, the shift to intensive food
production heralded a transition to coercive andnon-egalitarian
institutions, or so-called extractive institutions [67].(d) The origin of states and large-scale markets
Agriculture ultimately led to the emergence of multiple levels
of hierarchical organization—states. In a state, the individuals
just below the leader in the hierarchy each specialize in just a
subset of the tasks of the ruler [68]. The creation of special-
ized authority roles represents a new institution, i.e. a new
political game form that determines the rules of the economic
interactions of commoners.
The archaeological evidence shows that the first states arose
by the aggregation of previously independent groups, rather
than by one group simply expanding in size and displacing its
neighbours [69]. At least two types of between-group inter-
actions are implicated in driving this aggregation: warfare and
trade [69]. The role of warfare is quite intuitive: aggregation
can happen by one polity forcing another to become subor-
dinate to it. The role of trade is often seen as creating ties
between chiefs, through the procurement and exchange ofprestige goods (e.g. [70]; see [71] for a review). However, there
is also evidence that staple goods were traded over long dis-
tances during the Neolithic [72]. Indeed, institutional rules
regulated trade during the Neolithic [71]. Trade would be
most reliable, and have lower transaction costs [73], with those
others that were playing by the same institutional rules. Insti-
tutions could therefore provide a pressure for groups to
aggregate into a larger polity in order to reap the gains of
economies of scale and scope from trade.
In modern states, division of labour is so pronounced that
individuals are critically dependent on others outside their
family and close friendship circles for food, as well as for pro-
tection from the myriads of hazards encountered during their
lifespan. These vital elements for reproduction and survival are
often supplied by decentralized competitive markets. This
arrangement results in a ‘mutual dependence among strangers’
[74] where there is a remarkable level of trust among interact-
ing individuals, which appears to be as uniquely human
as language.
The central problem behind the functioning of any market,
and more generally any large-scale society, is that no one has
complete information [75]. The rewards of competitive
exchange thus seem unachievable without institutional rules
that guarantee at least secure property rights and that enforce
the various structural characteristics of information flow inmar-
kets [21]. Furthermore, not all markets can be efficient because
resource allocations made at the individual level often result in
externalities, i.e. the effects of an individual’s action can spill
over into the environment and negatively affect other indi-
viduals, creating a tragedy of the commons situation [76].
This forces groups to design institutional rules that regulate
any spillover on the environment, such as the mediaeval Law
Merchant system that facilitated trade between strangers by
spreading information about their past behaviour [14].
Indeed, the quality of institutional rules has been proposed as
being the single main determinant of whether modern nations
will succeed or fail. Acemoglu & Robinson [67] distinguish
between institutional rules that are inclusive, meaning that
they provide incentives to individuals that reward them for
their productivity, in contrast to extractive rules that reward
only a few individuals and that fail to adequately protect
property rights.4. Discussion
Institutions, the individually devised communication pro-
cesses that produce rules to structure social interactions, are
evolved (extended) phenotypes that fundamentally rely
on language. They are key determinants of, and may be
necessary to explain, the last major evolutionary transition.
In economics, institutions are often thought of as being
formed by individuals with unbounded levels of cognition;
that is, individuals following the neoclassical rational choice
assumptions ([73], ch. 3). But preferences for forming insti-
tutions, and for institutional rules, can also evolve by
processes of cultural evolution [63]. Consequently, institutions
can be formed by individuals that have only bounded ration-
ality (like probably any hominoid), as long as institution
formation increases an individual’s own pay-off, or their
inclusive pay-off or fitness. Our hypothesis for the emergence
of large-scale societies relies on self-created and self-enforcing
institutional rules, which regardless of the exact level of
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direct benefits from cooperation and coordination. Under
self-enforcing institutional rules, cooperation, and monitoring
and sanctioning are adaptive at the individual level.
There are at least three alternative hypotheses for the evo-
lutionary origin of large-scale human societies. The first rests
on individuals performing biased social learning, especially
conformity-biased learning, whereby individuals tend to imi-
tate the most frequent behaviours within their group. This
creates high cultural relatedness within groups, and thus
enables cultural group selection [77]. Although the conditions
under which this really works remain unclear [78–80], a very
low level of rationality is implicitly assumed, since individuals
are assumed to be unable to compute when it would actually
be advantageous to express shirking behaviours instead of to
conform [81]. Consequently, in contrast to the institutional-
path hypothesis, the biased-social-learning hypothesis entails
that cooperation is often maladaptive at the individual level.
Yet although experiments show that human infants develop
a propensity for unconditional helping by the age of 2 years,
by the age of 3 years they start to become influenced by the
past behaviour of their partners [82]. In other words, as they
develop, children do start to take account of the expected
benefit when decidingwhether to cooperate. Such individually
beneficial cooperation is expected under the institutional-path
hypothesis. Interestingly, this is the same age at which children
start to normatively enforce the rules of artificial games in the
laboratory [83].
Moreover, because the cultural evolution literature has
essentially ignored the possibility of humans playing a polit-
ical game form, it has implicitly assumed that the rules of the
economic game form cannot be changed by a process operat-
ing within groups. As such, the cultural evolution literature
has concluded that rules can only change by a slow and exter-
nal process of between-group competition, rather than being
variable in the short term through internal negotiation. But
this conclusion does not fit well with the large brains and
advanced planning and negotiation skills of our species.
The second alternative hypothesis presupposes the for-
mation of coercive hierarchy, which results from strong
asymmetries in physical strength or power within groups
(figure 1). Coalitions of powerful individuals (elites) are able
to coerce others when surpluses, as produced by agriculture,
are large enough to be exploited. They may increase this coer-
cion as groups expand in size throughmonopolizing resources
gained through conflict with other groups [84,85]. This ulti-
mately results in elites creating coercive states through
conquest [86]. Under this hypothesis, individuals may still
behave in their self-interest when coerced, but the social equilib-
rium will be far from one that gives a high pay-off to the
majority of individuals.
The third alternative hypothesis (the ‘interdependence
hypothesis’) is based on the idea that cooperation in early
humans was mutualistic, with individuals becoming highly
dependent on each other through the scavenging of the car-
cases of large game, which later extended into cooperative
hunting [87]. This required the development of shared inten-
tionality, and then other advanced socio-cognitive features
such as language, in order to ensure successful coordination
in high risk Stag–Hunt game situations. The high interdepend-
ence of individuals, combined with the possibility of partner
choice, provided an incentive for individuals to use reputation
when deciding whether to cooperate with an individual.However, this kind of cooperation was threatened as group
size expanded, partly due to the problem of knowing the repu-
tation of other group members. It is hypothesized that this
problem lead to the adoption of group-wide norms and con-
ventions, and symbolic markers as proxies for reputation [87].
There are clearly strong connections between all these
hypotheses, and several elements of them are not mutually
exclusive. Both the biased-cultural-transmission and the insti-
tutional-path hypotheses rely fundamentally on cultural
evolution, and thus involve social learning. Themain difference
is the conception of rationality with which individuals are
endowed. Under the institutional-path hypothesis, individuals
are assumed to have high levels of cognition and rationality (see
§2e), enough at least to respond adaptively to their social
environment and reinforce individually beneficial actions
under most circumstances. But it does not require conformity-
or prestige-biased transmission at all. While conformity is
surely important in humans and other primates, we also
know that humans are flexible with their investment in
cooperation depending upon the context [81,88,89] and that
there is strong within-culture variation in the social learning
strategies that individuals employ [90]. The institutional-path
hypothesis better fits with these findings, by not requiring
within-group homogeneity of behaviour or preferences.
Having institutions also does not exclude hierarchy and
dominance. If hierarchical command is an efficient mode to
solve economic problems as group size increases [25], then
the voluntary creation of hierarchy and leadership is exactly
what we expect to see in the long-run under the insti-
tutional-path hypothesis. The political game form can then
subsequently change into one of dominance, where the new
leaders take advantage of the costs of resisting or dispersing
to create institutional rules that benefit themselves at the
expense of others [65,66], paving the way to extractive insti-
tutions. However, coercive hierarchy seems to be inherently
unstable [8] and costly to maintain, given the possibility for
subordinates to form coalitions. Moreover, extant small-
scale societies demonstrate that egalitarian institutions can
resolve social dilemmas in irrigation and other agricultural
problems, and often do so more effectively than coercive
institutions [13].
Finally, both the institutional-path and interdependence
hypotheses agree that human cooperation first emerged
through direct and indirect individual benefits in small
groups. But the interdependence hypothesis argues that the
mechanisms supporting this must have broken down in large
groups, leading to the use of conformity, group-wide norms
and conventions, and symbolic markers as proxies for repu-
tation. However, this hypothesis does not provide an account
of how particular group-wide norms and conventions would
be adopted. By contrast, under the institutional-path hypoth-
esis, institutional rules continue to provide direct benefits to
cooperating even in large groups and are created by a political
game form.
We conclude that the key puzzle about large-scale human
societies is not how to explain the existence of altruistic
cooperation that is costly and fitness reducing over an individu-
al’s lifetime, as has been widely suggested [91]. Instead, the
puzzle lies inunderstandinghow the institutional rules that pro-
vide lifetime direct benefits to cooperation and coordination are
generated and sustained over both short and long time-scales.
From a theoretical perspective, there is a need for further mod-
elling work on the evolution of institutional rules. From an
rstb.royalsocietypublish
9empirical perspective, future work should investigate further
how the cognitive prerequisites for creating institutions evolved,
and what the exact level of rationality required is. It should also
examine the role of the coevolution of trade and warfare with
institutions, and the concomitant rise of large-scale societies.
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